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On St Margaret Street
Abstract
It is not unusual to hear events in public space, be they state-sponsored or resistant, described as ‘pure
theatre’, ‘political drama’ or ‘political theatre’. Historically, discussion of political events in public space
has often started from the premise that they are ‘theatrical’ because they share attributes with
conventional theatre practice – because they use actors, props, scenery, narratives. Certainly, events such
as rallies, military parades and demonstrations are ‘theatre-like’ to the extent that they are concerned with
concepts and ideas not otherwise materially present, they are organised around the symbolic production
of meaning, and they are ‘stage-managed’ in order to be read. Yet it seems to me that the ‘theatrical’ must
be expanded as a category both in order to permit a politicised and serious engagement with public
events from a theatrical perspective, and also to defend the theatre itself from marginalisation. As soon
as the ranks break, the teargas explodes, as soon as damage is done – as soon as anything really
happens – it is no longer called ‘pure theatre’ or ‘political drama’.
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On St Margaret Street
Sophie Nield
It is not unusual to hear events in public space, be they state-sponsored
or resistant, described as ‘pure theatre’, ‘political drama’ or ‘political
theatre’. Historically, discussion of political events in public space has
often started from the premise that they are ‘theatrical’ because they
share attributes with conventional theatre practice – because they use
actors, props, scenery, narratives. Certainly, events such as rallies,
military parades and demonstrations are ‘theatre-like’ to the extent that
they are concerned with concepts and ideas not otherwise materially
present, they are organised around the symbolic production of meaning,
and they are ‘stage-managed’ in order to be read. Yet it seems to me that
the ‘theatrical’ must be expanded as a category both in order to permit a
politicised and serious engagement with public events from a theatrical
perspective, and also to defend the theatre itself from marginalisation.
As soon as the ranks break, the teargas explodes, as soon as damage
is done – as soon as anything really happens – it is no longer called
‘pure theatre’ or ‘political drama’. Once the event cannot be contained
as a summary, or a description, or a performance about something else
(the coronation as about monarchy and kingship, the parade as about
military might and international relations, the demonstration as about
the will to, we might argue, democracy) then it is immediately retrieved
into ‘actual’ and not ‘theatrical’ politics. The term ‘theatrical’ itself
almost becomes a marker for artificiality, which I think is a significant
problem for the field of theatre and performance studies. In a sense,
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what is happening is that this critical frame assumes two discrete
spheres – the ‘real’ and the ‘symbolic’, or ‘theatrical’. I’ve recently been
looking at the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on our rights as citizens in
relation to public space, particularly in terms of surveillance, border
crossing and restrictions on the rights to assembly, which I think offer
particular challenges to our ability to express dissent and resistance to
our governments. In this short piece, I want to look at the production
of a particular space of exception in the heart of theatrical London.

On St Margaret Street, two statues face each other across a busy
road. The first is of Oliver Cromwell, Civil War General, leader of
the Commonwealth, and, until his death in 1658, Lord Protector of
England, Scotland and Ireland. Directly opposite is an image of Charles
I, executed by Parliament in 1649, the last King to rule in England by
the will of God alone, and without the expressed consent of the people.
This period, 1649 to 1660, when Charles II returned from France to
become King, is the English interregnum. The English interregnum
was precisely about the distance between sovereign and governmental
power: ambivalent and provisional space currently circulating around
the legal concept of the state of exception. In the summer of 2007,
St Margaret Street was closed to traffic while security barriers and
other anti-terror street furniture were installed. Black ramps and steel
posts that rise up out of the ground now fill the space between the
monuments. For St Margaret Street is the street on which the Houses
of Parliament stand. This short essay will outline the relationship of the
state of exception to the schisms between sovereign and governmental
power, drawing on the work of Agamben and Butler, before returning
to the question of public demonstration as it is increasingly restricted
by anti-terror legislation – beginning, I hope, to open up some further
questions around theatrical politics and the state.
First, I will offer a little detail about the interregnum.1 Interestingly,
there are a number of historical parallels between the seventeenth
century and the present. The trouble which would ultimately lead to
the civil wars began in the 1620s, as Charles I sought to raise taxes for
a series of expensive foreign wars. He needed the support of Parliament
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– at that time comprised of landowners and aristocracy – who took
advantage of the moment to secure concessions. The Petition of Right
in 1628 sought commitment on the part of the sovereign to refrain from
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment in breach of the terms of Magna
Carta, and protested both the lack of enforcement of habeas corpus,
and the exemption of officials from due process. All of these concerns
have found their echoes in recent years in the politics circulating around
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the former Labour governments
attempt to pass a law allowing 42 days detention without charge.
The 1628 Petition was accepted by the King, but was followed by an
eleven year suspension of parliament, known as the ‘11-years’ tyranny’,
in which sovereign power, exercised by the King, held sway. In 1640
Charles was forced to reconvene Parliament in a further attempt to levy
taxes: the ‘long’ parliament of that year passed a law forbidding the
King to dissolve Parliament again without its consent. The following
several years saw much suffering and strife as the first and second civil
wars took place, resulting in the unprecedented occurrence of the trial
of a king on charges of high treason. The French of course were still
over 100 years away from their Revolution.

On 28 December 1648, the rump parliament found the king guilty:
it being treason ‘by the fundamental laws of the kingdom’ for the King
to ‘levy war against parliament and the kingdom of England’. There is
of course a significant legal difficulty here: the King is, to an extent, the
state, and is certainly its head. Even now in the UK, persons are tried vs.
‘Her Majesty’, and detained at her pleasure. The separation of the person
of the king from the role, so to speak, of the king, is best explained by
Ernst Kantorowicz, in his famous study of mediaeval political theology.
Kantorowicz (1957) examines the precept of the King’s Two Bodies:
the political body and the natural body, the co-existence of which
effectively means that though the King can be demised, he cannot die.
The King’s body politic, Plowden noted, is ‘utterly void of infancy and
old age, and other natural defects and imbecilities, which the body
natural is subject to, and for this course, what the King does in his
body politic cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his
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natural body’. This seems a simple problem – but it isn’t. In medieval
law, the two bodies of the king are connected in complicated ways.
And thus, the king cannot die:
[H]is natural Death is not called in our law the Death of the king,
but the demise of the king, not signifying by that word (demise) that
the body politic of the King is dead, but that there is a separation of
the two bodies, and that the body politic is transferred and conveyed
over from the body natural now dead … to another body natural. So
that it signifies the removal of the body politic of the King of this
realm from one body natural to another’ (Plowden 1816: 212a, cited
in Kantorowicz 1957: 7)

The separation of these bodies, and through it the birth of
constitutional monarchy and governmental power in England,
occurred through this revolutionary process of law, and the forcible
separation of the body of Charles from his head, when Parliament
retained for itself the right of the body politic – the ‘king’s judgement’
– to act against the body natural of the King. ‘Kingship’, mobilised
by Parliament, condemned the King, in order to produce sovereignty
without sovereigns.

The Commonwealth existed between 1649 and 1653, at which time,
an Instrument of Government was passed creating Oliver Cromwell
as Lord Protector, followed by a second in 1655 which dissolved the
Protectorate parliament and placed the state under military rule.
Cromwell was offered the crown, but refused in May of 1658, saying
‘I would not build Jericho again’. In 1660, the monarchy was restored,
and Charles II was crowned King. He was King, however, by both
the Grace of God and the will of Parliament – effectively, the absolute
sovereignty exercised previous to the Revolution was over. We could see
this, I would argue, as a shift from sovereign to governmental power.
The return of King did not return sovereign power.
Back on St Margaret Street, the security apparatus, installed in
response to the ‘threat of terror’ (terror and security now apparently
operating as an inseparable dyad), sits literally in between the icons of
sovereign and governmental power. Manifested in this space-between
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is, not the actuality, but the spectre of terror, experienced here, as
elsewhere, as the disruption of normalcy, the presence of menace and
indicative of the legal states of exception which are increasingly its real
work. Much of the writing and thought on the emergencies of terror
and security – detention camps, the suspension of habeas corpus, the
infringement upon civil liberties and human rights, stop and search
powers, detention without trial, ‘illegal non-combatants’ and so forth
across many disciplines – is circulating around the idea of the state
of exception. Agamben defines the state of exception as the law at a
standstill; it is not lawlessness, nor is it illegal; it is the moment when
the state itself legislates its own exemption from the law. Agamben
writes, ‘[i]t is as though the juridical order contained an essential
fracture between the position of the norm and its application, which, in
extreme situations, can be filled only by means of the state of exception,
that is, by creating a zone in which application is suspended, but the
law as such remains in force’ (Agamben 2005: 31). In other words, in
instituting a state of exception, governments do not suspend their right
to govern, only to govern by application of the law.
I want to introduce here Judith Butler’s reading of the war prison,
in which she proposes the state of exception explicitly as a site in which
governmental power, pace Foucault, re-assumes sovereign power, thus
evading and escaping its own adherence to the rule of law. She writes:
[T]he state used to be vitalised by sovereign power, where sovereignty
is understood, traditionally, as providing legitimacy for the rule of
law and offering a guarantor for the representational claims of state
power. But as sovereignty in that traditional sense has lost its credibility
and function, governmentality has emerged as a form of power …
distinct from sovereignty. Governmentality is broadly understood
as a mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of
bodies and persons, the production and regulation of persons and
populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and
restrict the life of the population. Governmentality operates through
policies and departments, through managerial and bureaucratic
institutions, through the law, when the law is understood as ‘a set of
tactics’, and through forms of state power, although not exclusively.

7

Nield
… The suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence
of governmentality and sovereignty; sovereignty is exercised in
the act of suspension, but also in the exercise of legal prerogative;
governmentality denotes an operation of administration power that
is extra-legal … both act in the name of the state.

In other words, sovereign power is allocated to governmental
executive and administrative powers. She concludes this section:
In the moment that the executive branch assumes the power of the
judiciary and invests the person of the President (in the UK the Home
Secretary) with unilateral and final power to decide when, where and
whether a military trial takes place (or civilian trial), it is as if we had
returned to a historical time in which sovereignty was indivisible,
before the separation of powers has instated itself as the precondition
of political modernity … the fact that managerial officials decide who
will be detained indefinitely … suggests that a parallel exercise of
illegitimate decision is exercised within the field of governmentality’
(Butler 2004: 52-4).

In other words, your human rights are safe until an official of the
government decides that they are not.

Back on St Margaret Street, Brian Haw began protesting against
the Iraq war outside the Houses of Parliament in 2001. This was
a controversial issue – his protest / display extended the length of
Parliament Square, and included messages from well-wishers, peace
flags, images of Iraqi children maimed, photographs of war victims,
painted slogans and placards. Haw slept in Parliament Square, and
was often joined by peace protestors from around the world. Any
visitor to Parliament, including heads of state, foreign dignitaries and
even the Queen, arriving in her coach to open Parliament, had to pass
by the display, not to mention hundreds of thousands of tourists and
Londoners going about their daily business. It began to be clear that
this protest was not wanted by the Government.

Despite Tony Blair having said in Parliament on 7 April 2002 ‘when
I pass protestors every day at Downing Street … I may not like what
they call me, but I thank God they can. That’s called freedom’, Haw
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was harassed and pressurised, and attempts were made to discredit
him personally in the press and elsewhere. Finally the government
went to the law.

In 2005, the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act legislated that
no demonstration was possible within a kilometre ‘in a straight line’ of
Parliament Square, without the prior permission of the Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police. It is now illegal to demonstrate outside
Parliament without the express permission of the police, in writing,
a week in advance.
132: Any person who
a) Organises a demonstration in a public place in the designated area or
b) takes part in a demonstration in a public place in the designated
area or
c) carries on a demonstration by himself in a public place in the
designated area
is guilty of an offence if, when the demonstration takes place, authorisation
for the demonstration has not been given under section 134(2).
This is punishable by up to 51 weeks in prison. 2

Brian Haw’s protest was dismantled on 23 May 2006, despite the
courts finding that this legislation could not be retrospectively applied.
Ironically, Brian Haw is now the only person who is able to demonstrate
without a permit in the vicinity of the Houses of Parliament: shortly
after the ruling he was once again to be found in the Square, and
remains in place at the time of writing. Others have not fared so well:
Maya Evans was arrested in 2005 for reading out the names of the dead
of the Iraq war at the Cenotaph. Steven Jago was arrested in 2006 for
walking down Whitehall carrying a placard quoting George Orwell.
The activist comedian Mark Thomas in 2006 organised a series
of Mass Lone Demonstrations, in which people were encouraged to
submit requests to the police in large numbers seeking permission to
demonstrate as individuals, thus tying up the Met in reams and reams
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of administrative paperwork.

Perhaps the most interesting response was by the artist Mark
Wallinger. His piece, State Britain, was installed from 15 January to
27 August 2007 in Tate Britain. This artwork meticulously re-made
Brian Haw’s original protest display – a 40-metre wall of banners,
placards, images and so on. Despite following hard on the dismantling
of Haw’s actual display, the piece was a recreation based on detailed
photographs, rather than being an installation of original items from
the protest itself.
Tate Britain lies just under a kilometre from the Houses of
Parliament – and the exclusion zone (marked on the gallery floor by
Wallinger) neatly dissected the exhibition. ‘If I stand here’, noted the
artist in an interview in January 2007, ‘anything I say can be taken
down and used against me. Now here (stepping over the line), I’m free
to speak my mind’. He continues, ‘Once you draw a circle around the
seat of power, that is a surveillance society ... The zone goes through
Buckingham Palace. If one were to misinterpret the Trooping of the
Colour...’ (Mueller 2007)

There are obviously several provocative questions opening up here
about art and protest, representation and efficacy. Paul Dwyer, writing
on the Aboriginal Tent Embassy opposite the Parliament building in
Canberra notes that, ‘protests that might appear to be operating in a
“purely symbolic” register are now very likely to fall foul of new powers
given to Australian police under recent “anti-terror” and sedition laws’
(Dwyer 2007: 200). The ground has shifted. Initially discarded as
‘pure theatre’, now the very theatricality of protest is legislated against.
While demonstration is technically still possible, open access has been
removed, both spatially and legislatively. The material appearance
of dissent (the public presence of the people) has been replaced by
architecture designed to produce the spectre of dissent (the threat of
terror), manifesting the state of permanent emergency characterised
by Agamben as the state of exception. The English interregnum was
precisely about the distance between sovereign and governmental
power. The space that remains between them is, it seems, if we are
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to read the visual clues of St Margaret Street, increasingly populated
with the performances of security staged by the state of exception. In
this way, the new interregnum appears in the space created inside the
memory of the first – and is equally concerned with controlling the
ability of the people to appear as, and act for, themselves.

Notes
1
2

For general histories of the civil wars and the English Revolution, see for
example Adamson 2009; Hill 1975; Kelsey 2001

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050015_en_1 accessed
13 August 2010
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